CRIME AND TERRORISM PREVENTION
"Strategy is for amateurs; logistics is for professionals" (Gen. Norman Schwartzkopf)

    Crime prevention is an area of criminal justice incorporating all formal and informal approaches that deter crime as well as anything which reduces the risk of victimization.  Victimization is simply defined as the process of becoming a victim, either in real life or in some anticipated future.  In short, anything a government, a community, or individual does which makes victims less vulnerable to crime, alleviates the victim mindset, and/or deals with the negative emotions of victimhood (e.g., fear, frustration, helplessness, guilt, shame, anger, pessimism, depression) is crime prevention.  This area of criminal justice draws heavily from the fields of Victimology and Criminology, although not the most theoretical parts.  In terms of practical application as well as conceptual extension, victimology goes a little further than criminology in not only arguing victims deserve protection from crime but also from human rights violations (anything which dehumanizes, degrades, or robs a person of their dignity).  Not all criminologists accept this "widened" or human rights approach to the concept of victimization first advocated by the Schwendingers (1970).  Yet, the sense of security called for as a primary goal of crime prevention may be impossible without considering all the ways a person can be "wronged."  Let's take a look at the number of ways a person can harm another:

1. Physical abuse -- hitting, punching, pulling hair, slapping, grabbing, biting, kicking, bruising, burning, twisting, throwing, and of course, killing.
2. Sexual abuse -- any unwanted sexual contact, sexual intercourse without consent, rape, forced sexual perversion, forced unprotected sex, and forced sex with other people or animals.
3. Verbal abuse -- derogatory comments, insults, humiliations, or constant put-downs, usually with the victim told they are not physically attractive, inferior, incompetent, unable to succeed on their own, not a good role model, and need to be kept under total control.
4. Psychological/Emotional Abuse -- manipulation and/or intimidation intended to destroy the other's self-esteem or sense of self, usually over long periods of time, including but not limited to destroying or depriving someone of self-esteem, property, personal needs, food or sleep, and the comforts of pets.
5. Spiritual abuse -- self- or other-inflicted deep sense of betrayal by religious traditions or other moral agents of the community or when the victim feels that faith did not protect them and/or that the moral code of society has failed for them.
6. Economic abuse -- insisting they turn over their money, possessions, or wealth, having them beg for necessities, giving them insufficient allowance for basics, or refusing to let them participate in things.
7. Social abuse -- Jokes, criticisms, or put-downs, usually about appearance, sexuality, or intelligence; false accusations, suspiciousness, constant monitoring and control of victim's activities or access to information; isolation.

EARLY TO MODERN VICTIMOLOGY

    Victimology is actually an older field than criminology, going back to connections with 18th century penology (which evolved into penitentiary science, then probation science, then rehabilitation, then prison management, and then corrections).  Penology is the study of what punishment best suits the offender and simultaneously satisfies public opinion or demand for punishment.  Penology encompasses many topics and theories such as the four purposes of punishment -- deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation, but it mainly focuses on the relationship between the offender and society in the sense of "harm" done (Clear 1994).  Victimology, on the other hand, mainly focuses on the relationship between the offender and their victim, or as some would put it, the victim and their offender.  In fact, the titles of two important books in the field are telling about the twentieth century reception of a victim-focus in criminology in terms of who should be the primary focus, the criminal or the victim -- Schafer's (1968) book, The Victim and His Criminal, and Von Hentig's (1948) book, The Criminal and His Victim.

    Wolfgang (1958) continued a tradition that Mendelson (1963) started back in 1937 and was continued by Von Hentig (1948) which looked at most crimes (about 80% of them) as victim-precipitated.  This means that something the victim did, said, expressed, or represented (consciously or unconsciously) "precipitated" or caused their own victimization.  In fact, Mendelson (1963) went so far as to argue that some victims even had a death wish.  For many years, victimology as a field was obsessed with the many ways victims contribute - knowingly or unknowingly -- to their own victimization, and potentially, how they may share responsibility for the specific ways certain crimes are carried out. 

    Over the years, academics have come to think of victim precipitation in a negative light, "victim blaming" some called it (Ryan 1976).  Research into victim precipitation is now looked down upon as an unacceptable, unproductive exercise in labeling.  Yet a few enduring models or near-theories continued to persist. Two or three of them are explained below:

1. Luckenbill's (1977) Situated Transaction Model - This one is commonly found in sociology of deviance textbooks. The idea is that at the interpersonal level, crime and victimization is a contest of character. The stages go like this: (1) insult - "Your Momma"; (2) clarification - "Whadya say about my Mother"; (3) retaliation - "I said your Momma and you too"; (4) counter retaliation - "Well, you're worse than me or my Momma"; (5) presence of weapon - search for a weapon or clenching of fists; (6) onlookers - presence of audience escalates the situation.

2. Benjamin & Master's Threefold Model - This one is found in a variety of criminological studies. The idea is that conditions supporting crime can be classified into three general categories: (1) precipitating factors - time, space, being in the wrong place at the wrong time; (2) attracting factors - choices, options, lifestyles (the sociological expression "lifestyle" refers to daily routine activities as well as special events one engages in on a predictable basis); (3) predisposing factors - all the sociodemographic characteristics of victims, being male, being young, being poor, being a minority, living in squalor, being single, being unemployed. Sometimes the sociodemographic factors important to study are abbreviated as the SAUCER variables: Sex; Age; Urbanity; Class; Education: Race or Religion, and sometimes the threefold model is conceived of as antecedent (early), intervening (middle), and situational (late stage) factors.

3. Cohen & Felson's (1979) Routine Activities Theory - This one is quite popular today, and briefly says that crime occurs whenever three conditions configure or come together: (1) suitable targets - the presence of vulnerable potential victims; (2) motivated offenders - people who will try to get away with something if they can; and (3) absence of guardians - a lack of defensible spaces (natural surveillance areas) and the absence of private security, since the government can't do the job alone.  The ideas here bear a remarkable similarity to the "broken windows" thesis espoused by Wilson & Kelling in an Atlantic Monthly article during 1982, which held that if broken windows in a building aren't fixed, there will be tendency for vandals to break more windows, and if the building is unoccupied, it will become a magnet for squatters or arsonists, and if litter accumulates, soon nearby parked cars will be broken into...etc., etc.

    The above ideas have received much scientific criticism, as have other notions about the nature of the victim-offender relationship.  For example, the field of criminal profiling holds that when criminals and victims share the same sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., are in relatively the same age or social class group), this is known as the propinquity hypothesis. The hypothesis that criminals and victims often live in relatively close geographical location to one another is called the proximity hypothesis.  There is an equal amount of mixed evidence in support of both hypotheses, but they exist not so much for hypothesis-testing, but for making educated guesses at crime scenes.  There are also a number of so-called learning theories that have some established place in victimology.  In fact, there are three of them: (1) intergenerational transmission of violence - in which adults learn by having seen violence as a child; (2) learned helplessness -in which victimization occurs because of economic or emotional dependency; and (3) cycle of violence - in which both victim and offender are caught up in a tension-disinhibition, addictive cycle.  None of these are considered well-supported theories.  There's no one good theory in victimology. The cycle of violence theory tends to apply well with repeaters, but it has no more predictive validity than any of the other theories, near-theories, hypotheses, or ideas.  It would be a mistake, however, to think of victimology as a dead-end field because there are ongoing vibrant and promising areas of research, much of it dealing with micro-issues or small tidbits of bigger research questions.  It is safe to say no great or grand theories exist.

THE WAR ON FEAR AND COMMUNITY POLICING

    Preventing someone from becoming a victim requires doing something about the emotional state they are usually in.  Lenore Walker (1979) is to be credited for drawing attention to the emotion of "helplessness" among victims, particularly among women who choose to stay in destructive relationships.  Learned helplessness has three components: (1) information a person has about what is going to happen; (2) knowledge or perception about what will happen; and (3) a belief they cannot influence or control what is about to happen.  Much of the domestic violence literature, the famous Minneapolis Experiment in criminal justice, and most of the therapies and outreach programs are based on the third component -- how to overcome a belief that one has no control or influence over events.  It could be argued convincingly that "fear" comprises the first two components, and fear (or dread) is precisely what we should focus on.  This kind of focus did attract some attention during the community policing era of 1970 through 2001.

     Fear is basically defined in the dictionary sense as a expectation or apprehension of danger, and "dread" simply adds some element of horror or pandemonium.  Fear causes a fight-or-flight reaction, and dread causes paralysis.  Fear is different from anxiety because there must be at least some semi-identifiable threat, danger, circumstance, or situation.  Panic sets in when multiple fears are triggered.  As Slovic et al. (1981) point out, fear always involves some cognitive assessment of risk.  People may make an irrational assessment based on little to no information, or they may make a good assessment based on known information.  In either case, they try to weigh how "observable" or real the risk is, and they also try to calculate how "serious" it is.  Fear of crime is high only if the observed risk and seriousness both are high and is low if one or the other of the seen risk or seriousness is low (Warr & Stafford 1984).

    When people do NOT have enough information to make a rational assessment, they overestimate their personal vulnerability and come to rely on rumor, speculation, and conspiracy.  This over-reaction process is quite human.  The only thing that can counter it is reliable information that establishes what is called an "anchoring" point, which means going back to the beginning of what started the fear reaction in the first place. Anchors are the first pieces of information a person processes about a risk. Any information regarding the subsequent chain of emotion makes for what are called "adjustment" points.  Emergency and fear management professionals have for years argued that good anchor points should always be put forward by authorities as quickly as possible after a dangerous threat exposes itself.  In addition, information should be delivered by a trustworthy, single source with credibility and decision-making authority.  This is why agencies have public information officers.   Unfortunately, most initial anchors are things like "the largest manhunt in history began today..." or "an unprecedented event occurred today..." which feed on sensationalism rather than context. If the public comes to believe that authorities are powerless to deal with an "enormous" threat, the impression of dire seriousness and great uncertainty is given.  In such cases, the best thing to do is give the public more specifics, since panic has most likely set in.  It is also important to not keep repeating or broadcasting the same information about the threat. Because of something called the "availability heuristic," people will come to fear something more if they keep hearing the same thing over and over about it. Additionally, a type of irrational "news fatigue" may set in, which reduces vigilance and is just as dangerous.  The goal of crime prevention ought to be improved vigilance, or situational awareness.

    The community policing movement never really got very far in terms of enhancing situational awareness.  Instead, dozens of cities experimented with "gotcha cards" (officers leaving little notes on unlocked doors or windows saying "If I was a thief, I could have robbed you"), self-defense classes, security surveys, foot patrols, citizen newsletters, etc., etc.  Most of the ultimate purpose of community policing was empowerment, not fear reduction.  There was "broken windows" research, of course, which eventually established that FEAR of Crime = Incivilities + Disorder + Decay.  Incivilities were typified by the rudeness or impoliteness of people, disorder was conceived of as suspicious human behavior, and decay as the deterioration or dilapidation of some physical structure.  A fully-fledged criminology of danger never emerged, but it should have done so.

THE CRIMINOLOGY OF DANGER

    In the field of criminology, the concept of "danger" has been connected with at least three schools of thought: the social disorganization theorists of the 1930s; the parole success prediction researchers of the 1950s; and the labeling theorists of the 1970s (Walker 1980). In the field of anthropology, the study of "risk" (a term roughly synonymous with danger) is associated with the view that what we fear tells us more about ourselves that the source of our fears, and there exist many tribal (ethnic) icons of fear (Douglas 1992). In the field of sociology (the sociology of risk), the study of "danger" and study of "risk" involves looking at our postmodern society as a world which forces new kinds of uncertainty and unpredictability upon us (Brown & Pratt 2000).  Sociologists also continuously warn us about overusing the label "dangerous" in too many ways.  In the field of criminal justice, one will find studies of "danger" in many diverse areas, including the topics of domestic violence, serial killing, interpersonal violence, sex offenders, probation and parole violators, risk assessment in juvenile justice, ex-prisoner recidivism (the velocity of crime or how soon they reoffend), the setting of bail amounts, and pretrial detention. The fact of the matter is that the academic literature on criminal "dangerousness" is very fragmented, and easily confused with the topic of "dangerousness" in mental health settings.

    Perception of danger is a human skill.  This is best illustrated in de Becker's (1998) best-selling Gift of Fear book, as well as his follow-up treatise on uncertainty in a time of terrorism (de Becker 2002).  In the field of mental health, often an untrained, amateur observer is better at predicting when mental anguish will erupt into violence than a trained, mental health professional (Monahan 1981). In criminology, labeling theory, controlology (wave theory), control theory, and environmental criminology (to name a few) all dabbled in bits and pieces of research into the role of human intuition about dangerousness.  Advancement of research along these lines has been bogged down for about a hundred years because of some silly, social disorganization theory debate over compositional (types of people) versus contextual (types of situation) effects.  That's unfortunate, because there are lots of areas outside of criminology which are insightful, most notably in certain fields of psychology and the moral panic literature (Ben-Yehuda & Goode 1994).  Israeli law has even granted some legal force behind human intuition when it comes to assessments of "dangerousness" in counterterrorism contexts.  Intelligence professionals also know how to avoid "analysis paralysis" by using intuition to detect threats "over the horizon."

    Here's how average citizen intuition works.  Intuition is a word with many meanings -- some synonyms are: apprehension, insight, instinct, foresight, inspiration, sensitivity, perceptiveness, premonition, hunch, sense, impression, notion, inkling, funny feeling, gut feeling, and sneaking suspicion. The root of the word is tuere, which means to guard or protect.  A grocery clerk might overhear a potential terrorist mumble something like "They're going to pay soon" when the store is out of their favorite ice cream. Likewise, in ordinary conversation, one might pick up on some "dark humor" or dripping sarcasm by a participant in a conversation. There are few limits to the number of interpersonal situations in which suspicion and intuition are raised.  Sure, a lot of bias and stereotyping may be involved, but psychologically, what's going on in the mind of an observer is an attempt to separate signal from noise; i.e., sure-fire "cues" from the immediate environment versus prior experiences that may or may not serve as a guide in the present context.  In psychology, this cognitive place is known as the middle ground between retrospection and anticipation.  Context usually provides the knowledge needed to guide perception, but perception needs to come before knowledge for good situational awareness (Norman 1994).  Knowledge comes from two sources: (1) from cues or prompts that are immediately present in a situation; and (2) from memories and experience. This first kind of knowledge makes us think, and the second kind allows us to act without thinking.  For example, if you know from experience the relative weight of objects from their size, you do not need to think about how much effort will be needed to lift an object.  However, if your knowledge comes from the very act of perceiving, then you will need to think about what you've encountered before you make judgments or predictions about it. Too much information or too many expectations, and knowledge will bias your judgment and result in bad prediction.   

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PREVENTION

    Last (1980) was the one who first distinguished between three basic "kinds" of prevention -- primary, secondary, and tertiary -- and since then, this way of describing different approaches has been adopted wholeheartedly in the fields of criminology and criminal justice (Moore 1995).  It is customary for criminal justice students to be able to recite examples of the three basic kinds of crime prevention, but in recent years, a few more terms have been added to the lexicon.  Below is a summary list and explanation of all the different kinds of prevention:

• primordial -- actions that inhibit the emergence of risk factors in the first place; i.e., before causes begin to appear

• primary -- efforts taken to manipulate environments or modify factors correlated with undesirable behavior; i.e., to decrease the likelihood of occurrence or make it largely impossible 

• secondary -- efforts taken toward risk situations that if unattended to would lead to more serious problems; e.g., situations that are risk factors because they are involved in some developmental, growth, or contagion process

• tertiary -- intervention after a problem is well established which seeks to minimize the long-term consequences as well as implement new procedures to prevent recurrent incidents; but note the idea of "insulating" people and places who have been previously exposed to demonstrable risk factors is called "resilience"

• quaternary -- actions taken to overcome the consequences of excessive intervention; e.g., to avoid overmedication in a medical case or blowback in the context of counterterrorism

    Primordial prevention is a bit controversial, even in the field of health, because it requires intervention at the cultural level; i.e., changing the behavioral habits and patterns of people that are hazardous in the first place; e.g., smoking, poor diet, lack of exercise.  Primordial prevention of terrorism would require intervention into the root causes of terrorism itself.  Note that primary prevention is concerned with correlation, not causation (this being a concern among those scholars who decry that the field is not more evidence-based), but in any event, lots of criminal justice books have been written on primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention.  Two of the more outstanding volumes include Tonry & Farrington (1995) and Sherman et al. (1997).  To provide a quick summary, these volumes categorize prevention efforts by setting; e.g., the community composition level; the situational level (often taken to mean the neighborhood level); the developm[=-ental (adolescent attitude) level; and the law enforcement (arrest and incapacitation) level.   Clarke's (1992) situational approach is also noteworthy for its attempt at identifying 12 techniques, all based on the goals of reducing the rewards for crime, hardening the targets of crime, increasing the effort required by potential criminals, and increasing surveillance.  Textbooks on crime prevention such as Lab's (2010) usually fill in most of the details on the main kinds of prevention, and a case study approach is usually the research method most relied upon.  Gofrit et al. (2000) defined quaternary prevention as “debriefing, quality assurance, and improvement processes” which “complete the cycle of prevention by collecting information about the processes, multi-disciplinary analysis of the data, deriving conclusions, and distributing them to all the involved bodies."  Clearly, quaternary prevention is important, but how exactly to carry it out is somewhat unclear.

    An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure -- so the saying goes -- but long-term prevention is also interested in the "cure."  Long-term preventive measures, usually being offender-oriented, depend upon knowledge of causation or the elements necessary for something bad to happen.  For example, here are the elements that are minimally necessary for a crime to occur in terms of means, motives, and opportunities:

• Desire or motivation on the part of a potential criminal; e.g., a criminality mindset or "readiness" to commit crime (motives)

• Skills or behavioral abilities to carry out a crime; e.g., practice, rehearsal, organization, assembling tools needed, etc. (means)

• Opportunities to commit crime such as the existence of tempting targets which do not appear protected or guarded (opportunities)      

    Most criminal justice systems (and crime bills) do NOT try to curtail all the above (means, motives, and opportunities), and that is unfortunate since they rely primarily on the existence of the law itself (and promises of punishment) as a way to prevent crime (Waller 2006).  This reliance upon the law itself is called deterrence, and is quite different from prevention.  Both can uphold respect for the law, but prevention tries to reduce the rewards for crime while deterrence strives to increase the punishments for crime.  Under deterrence theory, it is hoped that sufficient punishment as well as examples of applied punishment will instill a psychological understanding of the consequences (specific deterrence) as well as more sociologically conforming behavior or habit among the general population (general deterrence).  Deterrence is something that the state imposes from the top-down.  Prevention is something that is usually unfunded and merely comprises the day-to-day efforts of ordinary people in everyday life.  In other words, ordinary people universally desire prevention, and will voluntarily take steps to carry it out.  No one disputes the human instinct to create environments free from problems.

THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM PREVENTION

    Terrorism prevention is an extraordinarily complex field aimed at what engineers call "wicked" problems, not so much implying "evil" but obdurate problems that seem to stubbornly persist.  Also, the very act of working on a wicked problem changes it.  There are few metrics for success, and one often never knows when prevention has accomplished its task.  The dictionary definition of prevention -- to stop something from happening or arising -- is not very useful.  Prevention is more like management or intervention, as in "managing" something that cannot be wiped out of existence, or interfering with the natural course of something.  In fact, the field could easily be called Prevention Management, as it often is in the fields of loss prevention, pollution control, and chronic disease.  Prevention and management go hand-in-hand with another concept, transformation, drawn from the area of conflict resolution (Miall et al. 2004) where what is "transformed" is the idea that achievement or success can only be accomplished by decisive use of force and coercion.  This notion that "soft" approaches will work as well as "hard" approaches is one of the main controversies in all areas of prevention, regardless of whether one is talking about crime prevention or terrorism prevention.

    Extending "what works" in crime prevention to terrorism prevention is a challenging task which requires some creative thinking.  Yet, that task is vitally important.  So much of what passes for terrorism prevention is either political rhetoric or drawn from other fields, like political science or international relations.  Criminology and criminal justice have much to offer, and in any event, doing something about a crime problem invariably will have significant impact on a terrorism problem.  Without belaboring the point any further, let's look at some examples of "extensions" below, noting that they are just examples to illustrate the task, not any authoritative list of perfect analogues:

CRIME PREVENTION AS COUNTERTERRORISM

    Criminologists and criminal justice scholars are optimistic about the possibilities of extending their theories into the field of terrorism studies.  However, as Lum & Koper (2011) point out, the most promising counterterrorism approaches may lie outside their purview and expertise.  Some crime prevention techniques, when applied to terrorism, are downright dangerous, involve treading on civil liberties, heavy-handed military maneuvers, or infiltration of religious institutions.  After all, some of the police-oriented crime prevention strategies tried during the era of "troubles" in Northern Ireland only made the problem worse.  Lafree & Dugan (2004) as well as Kennedy (2009) seem to think there are sufficient "parallels" between crime and terrorism, despite definitional differences, to make crime theory relevant to counterterrorism because it is true that terrorists often engage in the kinds of illegal activities that criminologists study.  British criminology seems to have given up on the project (Mythen & Walklate 2005), but American criminology (Rosenfeld 2002) has not.  Two edited volumes (Deflem 2004; Forst et al. 2011) exist as the best thoughts on the subject, but there really has not been much extension of unit crime theories (e.g., strain, learning, control, etc.) with the possible exception of smaller, more exotic, criminological theories such as the self-help framework and/or various lifestyle or victimization theories.

    Such recalcitrance among criminologists is understandable.  Criminologists, on the whole and as a profession, are committed to liberal or progressive causes such as abolition of the death penalty and doing something about guns and alcohol in society.  They are more likely to say the remedy for terrorism involves diplomacy, appeasement, or international cooperation.  They are unlikely to suggest, as this author (O'Connor 2009) does, that harsh measures need to be taken against terrorists, up to and including blowing them up.  Here's a recap of some ways criminology and criminal justice (mostly criminal justice) can be brought to bear against a terrorism problem:

    Clearly, a sufficient repertoire of techniques can be found in the arsenal of criminal justice.  It so happens that some of these have a sordid history of scandal or have been involved in constitutional controversies, but that is part of the challenge.  It can be argued that if American society had long ago dealt with some of these controversies -- like a workable, National ID system, adequate border control, or the extent of permissible surveillance -- we wouldn't need to revisit these techniques that, in all fairness, some police departments do well, and others do poorly.  It is time for criminal justice to step up and offer what it can, and bring the practices which have long lived under the shadow of darkness into light.  It is also incumbent upon criminology to start taking terrorist threats seriously, and start analyzing the organizational characteristics like they did with juvenile delinquency back in the 1950s.  Surely, more multi-disciplinary exploration, typology and framework construction, would be interesting, but to not build on what we already have would be foolish.  

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Last updated: Mar. 25, 2013
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O'Connor, T. (2013). "Introduction to Crime and Terrorism Prevention," MegaLinks in Criminal Justice, retrieved from http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3440/3440lect01.htm