The U.S. has not been inactive at these trouble spots.  Since the end of World War II, the United States has assisted in over 20 different coups (or regime changes) throughout the world, and is believed to be responsible for about 12 assassinations of political heads of state (Blum 1995).  The U.S. has also launched many "interventions" or overseas operations to bring democracy and human rights to trouble spots.  An intervention can range from minor interference in the affairs of another country to a full-scale invasion and occupation, with a variety of military/humanitarian missions in-between.  Some interventions are for "show of force" or part of a psychological warfare operation, while the most difficult missions, it could be argued, are those that combine humanitarian and military operations.  Military humanitarianism is a rather complex (and controversial) subject that has the potential to do well, but there are those who argue it's an oxymoron (see Military Humanitarianism is a Myth).  Yet, the idea of putting some when-necessary "teeth" in collective security is the whole point behind that organization known as the United Nations.  The U.N., to be sure, has a pretty spotty record on peacekeeping, and the U.S. can only do so much alone without the support of the international community.  Let's take a look at how the U.N. defines a "peacekeeping" operation in order to attempt fleshing out some international norms or standards.     

• A field operation established by the Security Council, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the collective expense of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by the member nations, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.

    The United States, however, recognizes and practices a much broader variety of peacekeeping, as follows:

• Preventive preemption -- "show of force" deployments, interpositions, early warning strikes, stepped-up surveillance activities

• Denial of movement -- no-fly zones, blockades, safe haven denial, guaranteeing, sanctions enforcement

• Humanitarian relief -- escort and protection of relief agencies, logistics, infrastructure support and re-building

• Peace settlement -- demobilization, disarmament, demining, election monitoring

• Military civil assistance -- truce enforcement, restoring law and order, political trusteeship

    The differences between U.N. and U.S. notions are significant.  While the U.N. simply looks at their job as keeping the two parties in conflict away from each other and monitoring a cease-fire (a rather strict view of the U.N. Charter), the U.S. goes way beyond that toward such ends as providing relief and rebuilding the infrastructure.  For example, it is not uncommon for America's military to do such things as build tent cities, distribute food, and set up hospitals and schools -- things that once left "newly freed" countries to do themselves or rely upon the mercy of NGOs or IGOs. 

    The world contains five (5) "superpowers" which are often referred to as the "Gang of Five" -- The United States, Russia, Europe (EU), China, and Japan.  Economy counts as much as military in determining superpower status. The EU has NATO, probably the world's most efficient military force. The Gang of Five dominate world affairs, and will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future.  Each and every superpower has both the incentive and capability to engage in covert action.  This raises some questions, which the Carnegie Council has rightly concerned itself with, as to the role of ethics in international affairs.  Is a preventive war ever justified?  What part of "Better them than us" is it necessary to understand?  Is there a moral obligation to engage in covert action?

    Humanitarian intervention is defined as the coercive intrusion into the internal affairs of another nation to do something about large-scale human rights violations (Evans & Newnham 1998), or better defined as "the justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice" (Fonteyne 1974).  Ocran's (2000) point of view ties the issue in with international law, but others (Boggs 2004) are more blunt about the connections with world domination.  No article of the UN Charter specifically mentions humanitarian intervention, but there are three U.N. conceptions of relevance: (1) a Chapter 7 enforcement action (dispatch); (2) brokerage of a peace settlement (nonmilitary pressure); and (3) post-conflict peace-building (material relief).  Only the first conception probably deserves to be called humanitarian intervention because the "enforcement" aspect usually means "coercive."  Further, as Nardin (2005) points out, any true humanitarian intervention requires the assumption of a hostile environment.  Hostile and fluid circumstances often preclude the development of good preventive war strategy, and in fact, caution about covert action always being necessarily driven (or overseen) by policy aside, sometimes decisive action simply needs to be taken, and done right.  In other words, sometimes nobody seems to care, and at certain points in time (timely or opportune times), it may be safely assumed that no one else seems disposed to intervene on behalf of some great injustice.  In many ways, this is the true humanitarian impulse, drawn from the fact that no one else seems to care.

    Mandelbaum (1996), however, warns against such unbridled "social work" where no real national or international interests are at stake.  He also warns about the possibility that policymakers might use various degrees of transparency about the operation to seek electoral advantage.  One doesn't intervene in the affairs of another country simply because their leader can be called a "tyrant" or doesn't meet your liking of their leadership (that might be called revolutionary intervention, not humanitarian).  It is also questionable whether preemption is justified unless "credible" evidence exists that the commission of a crime against humanity is imminent.  Prudence is the better part of valor, and no one-size-fits-all, utopian scheme exists.  The principle of sovereignty should serve as a restraint.  Different states will understand human rights differently, but there is a point at which atrocities will "shock the moral conscience of mankind."  It is at that point where unilateral  or collective intervention is needed.  Collective intervention is almost always preferred over individual intervention.  Selfish political purposes should have nothing to do with it.

    DIRTY HANDS AND SHADY CHARACTERS

    The dirty hands problem refers to the perennial problem of having to choose between unsatisfactory alternatives.  It also refers to times when a government employee has to do things in carrying out their duties which are morally repugnant, distasteful, or illegal.  Max Weber, the famous sociologist, talked about it in his "Politics as Vocation" lecture, and some more contemporary writing on it exists by Walzer (1973) and Griffin (1989).  The "problem" aspect involves the tendency of covert actors to construct a higher morality unto themselves, representing a kind of "slippery slope" or "noble cause corruption" where all sorts of things become excusable in the name of political necessity.  Simply stated, the slippery slope involves what was once an expediency or exception becoming a rule or norm.

    It can be easily said that nobody is immune from moral scrutiny by virtue of high office, and nobody is expendable by virtue of low office.  Covert action, however, often doesn't always keep everybody in the loop.  There are multiple moralities involved at various levels.  High office holders may not want to know everything because they don't want to get blood on their hands.  Low office holders may "use" others to do their dirty work in order to protect their careers.  Further, anybody who was in the loop and looks like a potential leak will frequently get discredited or "backstopped" in various ways.  Expendability, while controversial, is an essential part of damage assessment in operations planning.  If there is a moral imperative to covert action, it's the same as it is for all clandestine activity, and that's everybody should be on the same page equally knowledgeable of the secrets and employing the same morality, and at least sharing the same positive motivation.  Covert action should not be done for fun or profit.

    Typically, a covert operation involves secret financial support for a dissident individual or group to remove a dictator, terrorist supporter, or other dissident individual or group.  It is important under these circumstances to ensure two things: one, that the dissident is on the same page, and not harboring some ulterior motives or interests; and two, that the dissident is "vetted" as willing and capable of carrying out the act you want them to, ruthlessly and without hesitation.  Regarding the first condition, an accommodation of mutual interests may be all that's possible, and regarding the second, there should be no need to stoop down to the terrorist's level by kidnapping their family members to make sure they carry out the act.  Money works well in most cases, along with promises of protection for the dissident's family.  There should also be a backup plan in case of failure which protects operatives and their families.

    The problem with so much reliance upon money is that it tends to attract shady characters and promote a whole criminal underworld where payoffs breed corruption and corruption breeds more corruption, ad nauseam.  The transnational crime center has done many studies looking at the nexus between terrorism and crime, the bottom line being that it's not easy to win against an "unholy trinity" of crime, corruption, and terrorism, as Shelley (2005) has called it.  Under such circumstances, three different parties (criminals, politicos, and terrorists) are all going to have vested interests in maintaining the status quo, and not all of them are going to be interested in achieving a stable state.  In fact, it is even possible that war criminals might seek refuge via participation in covert action to cover their tracks or redeem themselves in some way.  Organized crime enters the picture usually through bribery or infiltration.  It is an unfortunate fact that MORE POLICING DOESN'T WORK in an environment where organized crime has settled into a "nexus" situation because bribery costs are low, the extra law enforcers are usually poorly-paid, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high to offset any gains in crime reduction from traditional deterrence.  In short, increasing the number of police officers often has the perverse effect of increasing corruption.  It has the same effect as throwing economic assistance at the problem.  Sometimes, nothing works except an overthrow of the whole government.  

ASSASSINATION BY ANY OTHER NAME

    Assassination is the deliberate killing of a strategically important individual.  Targeted killing is the saving of lives whereby anticipated acts of terrorism are prevented by assassinating an individual important to those terrorist acts.  Decapitation tactics is another name for it (Lebovic 2009).  There are many risks involved.  One risk is that the target could be replaced by a more ruthless leader, and a second risk is that the target could become a martyr and rally others to their cause.  However, there are potential advantages.  One, assassination usually decreases enemy morale, and two, assassination can paralyze a terrorist plot dead in its tracks.  Sometimes, even the threat of assassination can be a good tactical move.  Assassination can imitate suicide, accidental death, and natural death.  A well-planned assassination plot will consider the ramifications of exactly how somebody is brought to death.

    Most targets know they are targets, and for this reason they will typically employ bodyguards (close protection officers), body doubles (political decoys), armored vehicles, bulletproof clothing (body armor), motorcade deceptions, metal detectors, bomb detectors, and food tasters.  Bodyguards are the most common type of protection, and the more VVIP (Very, Very Important) a VIP (Very Important Person) is, the more bodyguards they will have, for themselves and members of their immediate family.  Bodyguards provide what "proximate security" which includes close quarter protection, residence protection, protection while at functions and engagements, and protection while journeying on foot, road, rail, aircraft, watercraft or any other means of transport.  Typical bodyguard services include ring round teams, isolation cordons, sterile zones, and access control, among other tactical maneuvers.  Security consultants are a step above bodyguards, and these kind of professionals usually provide strategic and system-level protections. 

    Most terrorists, however, are less likely to use bodyguards and more likely to use "human shields" such as women and children.  Use of human shielding is a blatant violation of international law.  It raises formidable difficulties for counterterrorism as well as for military operations, the standard approach to resolution being that any killing of human shields is regrettable, but a reality of armed conflict.  Another tactic that targets use is to be deceptive about their whereabouts, which almost always requires some sort of search and attack strategy on the part of authorities, and often over a wide area, as illustrated by the MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) map below which clarifies the point that most-wanted terrorists are likely to hide out in crowded, urban areas.
 

    Counterassassination is always a possibility, and that awkward term exemplifies how loaded the term assassination is itself.  By this is meant that reprisals lead to reprisals, often with innocent targets involved, thus raising the question of whether something should be called assassination or not.  In this regard, one can take the position that only killing somebody for political purposes can truly be called assassination, and revenge or reprisal would therefore not qualify.  Worse yet than spawning criminal revenge activity, there is the problem of creating a martyr.  Typically, creating a martyr occurs in one of three ways: (1) the target has a great deal of charisma and popularity; (2) the assassination was botched or failed in some way; and/or (3) the assassination was widely witnessed and perceived as a needlessly brutal act.  The first condition is a necessary condition, although some would argue a significant number of cases involve a target who was unpopular beforehand; the second condition espouses the traditional meaning of martyr as a kind of quasi-survivor; and the third condition is becoming more common in a globalized, media-saturated environment.  Also, in today's terrorist-driven environment, many terrorist groups via suicide bombing have usurped the martyrdom role in unique ways.  For example, Muslim martyrs typically seek to gain their status by murdering someone else along with themselves, as opposed to the traditional Christian view of martyrdom where status is gained by sacrificing only the self. 

    There are many methods associated with assassination.  Typically, the act requires an extensive degree of planning and preparation.  The more well-planned operations will create an opportunity of vulnerability within the target's daily round of activities, or a contingency plan may be in place for if and when the target breaks their daily round of activity.  Infiltration of the target's circle of associates is commonly done, although in many cases, one is relying upon assassination precisely because human infiltration has been next to impossible.  Generally, the more sophisticated the means used, the more extensive the planning and preparation.  Regarding efforts to make the killing look like an accidental death or suicide, an illustrative case is Alexander Litvinenko who was given a lethal dose of radioactive polonium-210 in late 2006.  While food poisoning has long been a method of assassination, this was one of the first cases of assassination using nuclear materials, which is a category of nuclear crime.  Coming up with new ways to kill people is a kind of industry to itself.

    The use of armed drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAVs) to kill a target (in what is called a decapitation strike) is only justified in an armed conflict.  That doesn't mean the target has to be a military one.  It can be a civilian who is directly participating in hostilities.  Drones have killed senior al Qaeda and Taliban figures in Afghanistan, and are becoming a large part of the U.S. arsenal in the war on terror.  The first known killing by armed drone occurred in November 2001, when a Predator targeted Mohammed Atef, a top al-Qaeda military commander in Afghanistan.  Drones operate by being fueled and maintained at airbases within a theater of war but are remotely piloted via satellite-connected ground control stations half-way around the world.  The most well known drone is the propeller driven Predator A (MQ-1), but then there is the more formidable Predator B “Reaper” (MQ-9) and the stealthier Predator C "Avenger."  There are many others, and they often crash due to bad weather, loss of communications, and human error factors.  Human rights groups have been critical of drone attacks, saying they cause too much collateral damage, but Lewis & Vitkowsky (2011) recount the Obama administration's four (4) reasons why the use of drones is essential:

• terrorist leaders are legitimate targets as belligerent members of an armed group at war with the U.S.

• drones are appropriate mission instruments as long as their use conforms to the laws of war

• targets are selected thru robust procedures that do not require legal process and therefore are not extrajudicial killings

• the targeting of high-level belligerent leaders does not violate domestic law banning assassinations   

    Additionally, a self-defense justification obviates the need for obtaining the permission of a "host" nation to conduct drone strikes.  However, relying solely upon the self-defense justification is problematic.  The laws of war also require necessity, proportionality, and immanent harm.  Clearly, the leaders of foreign countries do not like the U.S. conducting drone strikes in their territory without permission, and additionally, there is the problem of whether or not to target a U.S. citizen abroad who may be aiding the enemy (e.g.,  Anwar al-Alwaki, in Yemen).  The Obama administration, through FBI Attorney General Holder, announced in March 2012 that the government had the legal authority to use lethal force against American citizens overseas if an immanent threat existed, capture was not feasible, and the operation could be carried out in accordance with the laws of war.  Such actions -- as despicable as they sound because American citizens could be targeted -- would NOT be considered acts of political assassination, which is banned by Executive Order 11905: "No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination."  Congressman Ron Wyden (of Oregon) has been the staunchest critic of this new policy, joining other critics (such as the ACLU) in saying that the main problem is the unreviewable (or secret) nature of of the intelligence going into determination of whatever "immanent threat" an American citizen presents.

    The United States is a world leader in drone technology, possessing a fleet of approximately 7,500 drones.  China is rapidly escalating its program, and Iran is developing them.  They are relatively cheap to build, costing about $15 million apiece (versus $55 million for a fighter jet).  For going after enemies in geographically challenging regions, drones are militarily and politically safer and more economical than sending in special-operations teams.   There are many advantages to their use: no dead Americans, no captured soldiers, no wounded to transport home, no crashing helicopters, a minimum of soul-tormenting reflection, no blood or gore on TV or in print, and limited collateral damage.  Perhaps best of all, because drones are inherently a stealth weapon, foreign governments can deny any complicity or cooperation with the U.S.

TOWARD SOUND TARGETED KILLING POLICY

    The closest thing to a definition of targeted killing is "the morally legitimate ordering to death of an enemy combatant who represents a continuous and imminent terrorist threat based on reliable intelligence and where no other reasonable alternative exists to prevent the terrorist plot."  Note that this constructed definition uses the military phrase "enemy combatant" but could just as well mean "illegal enemy combatant" or any of the other limbo phrases applied to terrorists.  As opposed to assassination which often involves political figures, targeted killing almost always involves terrorists.  It is the ultimate prevention; i.e., a policy of "taking them out to lunch before they have you for dinner."  There are many different names for it, but it is not assassination in the normal sense.  Targeted killing is sometimes called selective targeting, extrajudicial execution, or long-range hot pursuit, but some of these terms imply it's a law enforcement action, which it is not.  It's an executive branch privilege, similar to covert action described above.  When it is called "selective targeting," what is selective about it is that it usually goes after the worst terrorists, such as the most deadly or the masterminds.  It is a highly controversial practice, which is in fact, illegal under international law if the phrase is interpreted to mean the same as assassination, which is prohibited both in times of peace and in times of war.  However, international law also recognizes certain rights to anticipatory self-defense, and presumably special exceptions when it comes to terrorism.  Further, targeted killing goes beyond preventive war in being a form of counterterrorism and not a type of national security strategy like annihilation or mass destruction.  Annihilation is associated with revenge, retaliation, or retribution, and has more profound consequences.  Targeted killing is a tool of prevention in counterterrorism.  The Israelis, for example, have long believed that targeted killing is an indispensable tool in the war on terror.  It should be noted the Israelis are not the only ones who have engaged in this practice since the U.S., U.K., and other European countries have also done so, in the wake of things like the USS Cole attack and the beheadings of kidnap victims by insurgent terrorists.

    In a case likely to become an important precedent under international law (Public Committee Against Torture, Committee for Clean Environment and Human Rights vs. The State of Israel, HCJ 769/02), the Israeli High Court in late 2006 ruled that the practice of targeted killing is not inherently illegal, especially when used against suspected terrorists, but each case must be assessed individually and in accordance with the laws of armed conflict.  For the Israelis, this means that the underlying conditions must involve some constant, continual, and murderous wave of terrorist attacks; the terrorist in question must have forfeited their right to the protected status of noncombatant by virtue of their participation in terrorism, including planning or preparation without signs of withdrawal or abandonment; and the international law principle of proportionality must be observed by seeking to bring about a quick peace or have other cost-benefit advantages.  There are four general rules the Israelis have pretty much lived by:

• there must be well-defined information on the target

• less harmful ways of removing the threat must be explored

• after each attack, there should be an independent investigation

• the attack must not cause harm to innocent civilians excessive to the military advantage obtained

    It may be noted that the Israeli practice is more "selective" than "targeted" because as the Israelis put it, only members of a "dream team" of terrorists are hit.  It may also be noted that the Israelis depart from the traditional laws of war in respect to the customary giving of some kind of warning announced in advance.  As the Israelis put it, sometimes they warn, sometimes they don't.  It's unclear if this uncertainty element is added for practical reasons or for congruence with some notion of retaliation.  Warnings would clearly be incompatible with the practice of assassination, unless of course, the threat was to be dealt with as some sort of deterrence strategy, but then that sort of strategy might advocate warning, being similar in principle to the law enforcement practice of "wanted posters."  These kinds of questions are likely to be topics of debate in the future as targeted killing attempts to find a "home" in either law enforcement theory, military doctrine, counterterrorism theory, and/or international law.  This author thinks it is most compatible with a fifth "home," the field of covert action, but there are other ways of looking at it, especially from an international law perspective. 

    Guiora (2006) for example, thinks targeted killing represents the emergence of a new kind of international law, if you will, and a new kind of Caroline doctrine (anticipatory self-defense) designed for dealing with newer, non-state actors or regimes.  Guiora (2006) also thinks that targeted killing is consistent (with only minor conflicts) with the traditional principles of proportionality, military necessity, collateral damage, and exhaustion or unavailability of peaceful alternatives.  From a military doctrine perspective, targeted killing may represent a trend towards a new kind of modern "warfare" or "lawfare," but that is pure speculation at this point.  From a counterterrorism policy point of view, it remains to be seen if it is an effective strategy, but the cost-benefit considerations that the Israelis have built in surely point to targeted killing being a part of counterterrorism in this direction.  From a law enforcement standpoint, it's highly unlikely that the "hot pursuit" concept will provide the practice of targeted killing much legitimacy, and while there may be some connections with modern intelligence-led policing, the deliberate carrying out of executions by law enforcement is an unacceptable practice, unless of course one is willing to return to the old "Wanted Dead or Alive" days.  In any event, emerging doctrines in the war on terrorism seem to be seeing non-state terrorism as some sort of hybrid "half-war; half-crime" offense where the offender uses military means and the victim is a non-military nation.  Biggio (2002) pursues some thoughts along these lines, but argues that such hybrid conceptions may provide more conflict than coherence.  One of those inherent conceptual conflicts worth noting is the blurred line between military action and law enforcement action.  Covert action has long had the problem of figuring out whether it's an intelligence action or paramilitary action.

    Targeted killing has a "when nothing else works" character to it, but it is nothing as horrible as total war, annihilation, or the extreme ends of the spectrum of conflict.  It is at the same time a strategy of law enforcement failure (no arrest can be made) and a strategy of military success (necessity).  It requires exemplary threat assessment.  If it represents a new kind of war on a new kind of battlefield, it may very well represent a strategy of long-term attrition (as another head pops up on the hydra).  There may also be displacement effects, as terrorists, like criminals, may simply move their operations elsewhere, living some kind of "life on the run."  Additionally, it may cause terrorism to morph into some newer kind of leaderless, sleeper, or solo form.  Clearly the international law on the subject is murky, and only time will tell if the practice finds its place or grounding.

REFERENCES